The toxicology sets the design basis. Hydrogen sulphide is detectable by smell at very low concentration, but it paralyses the olfactory nerve at concentrations well below those that cause serious harm, so a worker who stops smelling it may be in greater danger rather than less. At a few hundred parts per million it causes rapid unconsciousness, and at higher concentrations a single breath can be fatal. This is why sour facilities are built around fixed and personal detection, positive pressure breathing apparatus, wind indication, escape routes and muster arrangements that assume the release will not be smelled.

The materials problem is different in character. Sulphide stress cracking requires a susceptible material, a tensile stress and a sour environment, and when those coincide the failure is sudden and complete. Susceptibility is governed principally by hardness, which is why sour service specifications control hardness in the base material, in the weld and in the heat affected zone. A component that met specification when supplied can fail it after field welding or after cold work, which is why weld procedure qualification and hardness verification are treated as safety-critical activities rather than quality formalities.

Sour severity is not binary. ISO 15156 defines severity regions based on H2S partial pressure and pH, and the material requirements differ substantially between them. Facilities frequently apply either blanket sour specification everywhere, which is expensive, or apply it inconsistently, which is dangerous. Determining the severity region for each system, and recognising that it can change as pressure, water production and souring develop, is central to getting this right.

Reservoir souring adds a further dimension. Fields that produce sweet at first oil can sour over time through bacterial sulphate reduction, particularly under seawater injection. Facilities designed and constructed to sweet specification then find themselves handling sour fluid, with materials that were never qualified for it. Monitoring for souring and planning for it are part of long-term facility integrity in any field under water injection.

By the end of this training, participants will be able to:

• Describe hydrogen sulphide properties, exposure limits and physiological effects and their design consequences
• Determine sour service severity regions using H2S partial pressure and pH per ISO 15156
• Explain sulphide stress cracking, hydrogen induced cracking and related mechanisms and their susceptibility factors
• Apply NACE MR0175 and ISO 15156 requirements to material selection, hardness control and welding
• Specify sour gas processing including amine sweetening, sulphur recovery and tail gas treating
• Design sour water handling and stripping systems
• Specify H2S detection systems, their placement, alarm levels and executive actions
• Select personal protective equipment and breathing apparatus appropriate to sour operations
• Establish sour operating practice including entry, maintenance, purging and isolation
• Develop emergency response and evacuation arrangements for hydrogen sulphide releases

The training treats toxicology and materials as parallel threads that meet in facility design and operating practice, working through each with its technical basis and its consequence for engineering decisions. Severity region determination, partial pressure calculation, sulphur recovery duty and detection coverage are worked through numerically. Material specifications, welding procedure qualifications and hardness survey results are examined as working documents. H2S incident case histories, covering both toxic exposure and cracking failures, are analysed for the control that was absent, and participants are encouraged to bring sour service questions from their own facilities.

Organisations sending participants to this training will:

• Reduce the risk of hydrogen sulphide exposure incidents through better detection, protection and operating practice
• Reduce the risk of sudden cracking failures through correct material selection and hardness control
• Apply sour specifications proportionately rather than uniformly, controlling cost without adding risk
• Improve preparedness for reservoir souring in fields under water injection
• Strengthen compliance with sour service standards and regulatory expectations
• Build internal capability in an area where errors are severe and irreversible

Participants will:

• Understand the physiological hazard of hydrogen sulphide and why standard warning cues fail
• Determine sour severity and specify materials correctly for each system
• Recognise where sour service compliance is likely to have been compromised in practice
• Specify detection, protection and emergency response arrangements
• Understand sour gas processing and sulphur recovery in technical detail
• Build a specialist capability that is required across many major gas provinces

• Facilities, process and production engineers working sour assets
• Materials, corrosion and integrity engineers
• Operations engineers, supervisors and field personnel in sour service
• Project and design engineers on sour developments
• HSE and process safety practitioners covering H2S facilities
• Maintenance, inspection and welding engineers
• Emergency response and occupational health personnel

Upon successful completion of this training course, delegates will be awarded an official Certificate of Completion issued by the Petroleum Engineers Association (PEA), an ISO 9001:2015 certified training organization. The certificate carries 10 Credits and formally records the total learning hours completed.

Each certificate is signed by the Course Facilitator and the CEO of the Petroleum Engineers Association, and serves as verifiable proof of professional training that delegates can present to employers and professional bodies worldwide.